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REVIVING INFORMED CONSENT: USING RISK PERCEPTION IN 
CLINICAL TRIALS 
The current doctrine of informed consent falls far short of its potential to 
serve as a valuable safeguard for human research subjects.  Instead of 
providing a channel of communication between physician and subject, 
informed consent is a lifeless entity responsible for a large portion of the 
misunderstanding existing between these parties.  Acknowledging risk 
perception principles may help transform the informed consent process 
into an effective communication of health risks. 
Introduction 
Informed consent has become overlooked and underestimated in its role of protecting 
human research subjects.  Some critics have simply given up on informed consent: “informed 
consent has negligible influence on whether a person enlists in a trial.”1  Others lament the failure 
of informed consent by making broad generalizations that offer little constructive criticism, 
alleging that physicians should do “a better job of warning patients about complications . . . .”2  
“Informed consent must go beyond getting a person’s signature on a form.”3  But how?  There 
seems to be a unanimous consensus among physicians, the public, and the media that we need to 
breathe new life into the currently inanimate informed consent document.  Principles of risk 
perception lend constructive advice for transforming the informed consent process. 
The Clinical Trial Process 
 To market a new drug, the FDA requires the manufacturer to test the new drug in three 
phases of clinical trials.  During the clinical trials, the new drug is tested on human research 
volunteers to ensure the drug’s safety and efficacy.4  In phase I, 20-100 healthy volunteers 
(sometimes patients)5 receive the new drug to measure drug safety.6  Phase I tests only safety; 
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researchers at this stage do not gather information about efficacy.7  Next, during phase II the drug 
is administered to a group of several hundred patients8 with the “target” disease.9  Phase II tests 
for efficacy as well as safety.10  Finally, in phase III, the drug is tested on “hundreds and even 
thousands of patients.”11  This last phase provides information necessary to confirm the risks and 
benefits associated with the new drug.12  After completing phase III trials, the manufacturer may 
submit the research results to the FDA for approval in the form of a New Drug Application 
(NDA).  About 1 in 10 new drugs successfully pass through the rigorous three-phase process of 
clinical trials.13 
 In short, drug manufacturers use clinical trials to gather data about whether a drug is safe 
and effective for human use.  Although animal testing and other laboratory studies are useful in 
ensuring the safety of new drugs, there are some effects that cannot be discovered by any means 
other than experimental human use.  Therefore, clinical trials are necessary to protect the general 
public.  But what safeguards protect the individuals who participate in clinical trials? 
Legal Protections for Human Research Subjects 
The safety of human research subjects emerged as an issue of international importance 
after the heinous war crimes of the Nazi doctors came to light.  In response to egregious misuse 
of human experimentation, the Nuremberg court established the Nuremberg Code which set 
standards for medical experimentation on humans.  The first rule of the Nuremberg Code states: 
“The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.”14  As evidence from its 
prominent placement, consent is the backbone of ethical medical research.  Building upon the 
Nuremburg Code, the World Medical Association wrote the Declaration of Helsinki, which 
maintains the voluntary consent requirement, adding further that participation must not only be a 
voluntary choice, but also an informed one.15  In the United States, the requirement of informed 
consent for human research subjects participating in clinical trials is codified at 21 C.F.R. § 50.02 
(2003).   
                                                     
7 Id. 
8 Washburn, supra note 5, at W16. 
9 Baram, supra note 1, at 262. 
10 HUTT & MERRILL, supra note 4, at 516. 
11 Id. 
12 Baram, supra note 1, at 262. 
13 HUTT & MERRILL, supra note 4, at 516. 
14 Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law 
No. 10, Vol. 2, 181 Washington, D.C.: U.S. G.P.O., 1949. 
15 World Medical Association, Declaration of Helsinki (1989). 
In addition to informed consent, oversight provisions on the state and federal level protect 
human research subjects.16  Researchers are also required to report any adverse effects occurring 
during the course of clinical trials to the FDA and NIH.17   
Reviving Informed Consent 
Patients and physicians alike have lost faith in informed consent.  Patients feel that 
informed consent does not adequately disclose the potential risks.  Patients feel uncomfortable 
deciding whether to participate based on an oversimplified, watered down version of the true 
risks of the study.  However, most patients do not have the medical expertise to understand the 
risks as described by a physician or by the FDA.  Volunteers come from diverse backgrounds, so 
the same informed consent process may appear too simple to one individual and too complex to 
another.18  On the other side, physicians also express frustration with the current informed 
consent process.  Physicians often view informed consent as a legal technicality obstructing 
progress, and may consequently introduce informed consent by announcing “We have to consent 
you now.”19  The message is a command: “We have to get your signature now.”   A possible 
solution is to transform the command into a communication between doctor and patient. 
An effective communication must recognize the objectives of both parties.  First, the 
primary goal of the informed consent process is to protect human subjects.  Second, the informed 
consent process must ensure that people will continue to volunteer for the clinical trials so that 
society can continue to benefit from new drugs.   
Constructive criticism of informed consent must also recognize and address the failure of 
current communication skills in general.  The information researchers are trying to convey is 
mysteriously scrambled somewhere between the speaker’s mouth and the volunteer’s ear, like a 
very short version of the childhood game of telephone.  To close this communication gap, 
physicians conducting the informed consent process must take responsibility and initiative.  
Baruch Fischoff, an expert in risk communication, offers a guiding principle to address this 
dilemma:“If we have not gotten the message across, then we ought to assume that the fault is not 
with our receivers.”20  
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In sum, reviving informed consent requires improving communication skills and 
addressing the objectives of both patient and physician. 
Viewing Informed Consent as a Health Risk Communication 
 Informed consent is not the only context for practicing risk communication.  Principles of 
risk communication, and health risk communication in particular, have been explored in a variety 
of contexts.  For example, the threat of groundwater pollution requires industry representatives to 
engage in health risk communication with the local community.  The United States government 
may face the task of using health risk communication to inform the American public about the 
threat of biological warfare.21  Likewise, the informed consent process for clinical trials 
represents a situation that deserves a tailored health risk communication plan.   
The Inadequacy of Factual Data 
Despite the extensive laboratory testing of a new drug, the fact remains that a clinical trial 
is an experiment.  The information most useful to a potential volunteer—what will happen?—is 
unknown.  Even the known “facts,” such as toxicology reports and statistics from animal testing, 
are merely interpretations of data.  A statistician can easily manipulate such data to imply the 
desired results.  Those with experience in financial accounting may testify to the manipulability 
of numerical data.  The following example demonstrates how scientific data, while completely 
true and accurate, can be communicated in a way to mislead the public: 
Take the example of a story made famous a couple of years ago, when a 
junior high school student named Nathan Zohner surveyed a group of 
classmates for a school science project. Zohner told them about a 
chemical called dihydrogen monoxide. It is colorless, odorless, tasteless, 
and causes thousands of deaths every year. Prolonged exposure to its 
solid form causes severe tissue damage, exposure to its gaseous form 
causes severe burns, and it has been found in excised tumors of terminal 
cancer patients. Of 50 people Nathan surveyed, 43 said that dihydrogen 
monoxide should be banned, 6 weren’t sure what to do, and only one 
person correctly identified dihydrogen monoxide as plain old water, or 
H2O.22 
Regardless of additional regulations of clinical practice to monitor the accuracy of 
statistical data, the final numbers do not determine the success or failure of a health risk 
communication. Furthermore, the potential volunteer, an inexperienced layperson, will probably 
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not find raw scientific data useful in making a decision about whether to participate in a clinical 
trial.   
The Inadequacy of the Printed Word 
When designing informed consent documents, researchers and physicians debate at 
length the words that will effectively communicate the risks of enrolling in a particular clinical 
trial.  A national committee recommends “documents be written at an eighth-grade or lower 
reading level.”23  But others disagree: “If you have to put everything in eighth-grade terminology, 
that leaves out a lot, and that’s wrong.”24  In this way, drafters of informed consent documents 
face a double-edged sword.  If the document is simple, it lacks the specificity to adequately 
describe the particular risks.  If the document describes the detailed risk, the document would 
undoubtedly be too long and too complex to be understood by a layperson.  Efficiency demands 
the standardization of informed consent documents.  However, to effectively communicate health 
risks, we must resist standardization and consider the subjective, individual needs of the 
volunteer.  The informed consent document should serve merely as a starting point for the 
communication. 
Risk Perception as a Feasible Framework 
Fishoff suggests that effective health risk communication should begin by identifying 
“where the public is coming from.”25  As a first step to health risk communication, defining 
“where the public is coming from” recognizes that risk, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder.   
Too often, physicians and researchers mistakenly believe that if the data for a particular 
trial is good (that is, if the benefits outweigh the risks), then the rational reaction is to accept the 
risk.  In other words, the practitioner assumes that the subject perceives risk and reacts to risk in a 
rational way.  However, risk perception is not simply a balance between risks and benefits.  Risk 
reaction is often an emotional process, not a rational one.  The irrational process of risk reaction 
is demonstrated by public reaction to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the subsequent 
anthrax threat: 
Many of us were afraid, and rightly so.  But some people responded by 
driving to a distant destination rather than flying, even though the facts 
clearly showed that flying remained the far safer mode of transportation, 
even after September 11.  Some people bought guns, raising their risks 
from firearms accidents far more than reducing their risk of being 
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attacked by a terrorist.  Many people took broad-spectrum antibiotics 
even though they had no evidence that they had been exposed to 
anthrax—but they didn’t get an annual flu shot.”26   
Whether the decision to rely on emotional factors is conscious or unconscious, the fact 
remains that most individuals respond to risk in a way that reflects their feelings about risk, not 
their knowledge about risk.  Risk perception is an emotionally-based, individual response to a 
situation. 
To revive informed consent, we must acknowledge the emotional nature of risk reaction.  
Potential volunteers are likely to follow the general rule of emotional risk reaction behavior.  In 
contrast, the physician might not view the risk from such a subjective perspective.  The physician 
is acting in a professional capacity, and professionalism often demands objective judgment, free 
from emotional bias.  Similarly, the FDA will not approve a new drug based on feelings that the 
drug is safe and effective.  This rational viewpoint conflicts with the emotional viewpoint of the 
potential volunteer.  In order to effectively communicate the risks involved in a given clinical 
trial, the physician must acknowledge this contrast in perspectives.  The physician must ask not 
“What do I need to know to decide about the safety of this drug?” but rather “What does this 
potential volunteer need to know?”  To better understand the volunteer’s perspective, we refer to 
accepted principles of risk perception and apply them to the informed consent scenario. 
Using Risk Perception in the Informed Consent Process 
The previous section focused on the subjective nature of risk perception.  However, 
despite a broad spectrum of potential emotional reactions to perceived risk, “humans tend to fear 
similar things, for similar reasons.”27  Ropeik and Gray describe a series of guiding principles that 
predict how people perceive risk.  Application of some of these principles to the clinical trial 
setting may provide a better understanding of how risks should be communicated in the informed 
consent process.  Perhaps surprisingly, these risk perception principles often work in favor of 
effective risk communication.  In other words, according to this guide, the clinical trial setting is 
actually conducive to effective risk communication.  The following discussion describes several 
risk perception concepts and how they affect the informed consent process in clinical trials.  One 
has already been demonstrated:  
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• “You will generally be more afraid of a risk that could directly affect you 
than a risk that threatens others.”28 
This risk perception concept describes why the physician and the volunteer react differently to 
clinical trial risks.  The volunteer perceives a direct risk, while the physician perceives only an 
indirect risk.  Additional elements of perception may lend increased clarity to the informed 
consent process. 
Emphasize the Voluntary Choice of Participation 
• “Most people are less afraid of a risk they choose to take than of a risk 
imposed on them.”29 
Ropeik and Gray elaborate on this choice concept by providing an illustrative example: 
“Smokers are less afraid of smoking than they are of asbestos and other indoor air pollution in 
their workplace, which is something over which they have little choice.”30  Thus, the health risk, 
long-term lung disease, is less troubling when the individual voluntarily accepts that risk.  The 
support for this principle may be a bit circular.  Is the connection between choice and risk 
perception one of causation or mere correlation?  In other words, does choice affect risk 
perception before or after the choice has been made?  Before picking up a cigarette, a person 
might ignorantly believe that lung disease is not dangerous.  Based on this ignorant belief, the 
person decides to smoke.  Here, the decision to engage in risky behavior is based on incorrect 
information, not the freedom to choose.  In contrast, the lifelong smoker may also believe that 
lung disease is not dangerous.  Many habitual smokers claim to be aware of, but indifferent to 
evidence that smoking is dangerous.  In this case, the voluntary nature of the act causes the 
perception that smoking is low risk behavior.  The issue is whether one chooses to take risks 
because he or she believes the risk is low or whether he or she believes the risk is low because of 
a choice to engage in the risk. 
Clarifying the relationship between choice and risk perception is necessary in order to 
apply the principle to the informed consent process.  By necessity, the informed consent process 
must take place before the subject participates in the risky behavior.  Thus, the choice concept 
will have a greater impact on the informed process if the relationship between choice and risk 
perception is causative rather than correlative.  By emphasizing the voluntary nature of clinical 
trials, participants will feel a greater freedom of choice, and thus will perceive a lower risk.  If the 
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freedom of choice causes the individual to perceive the risk as low, then emphasizing voluntary 
participation is even more important. 
If voluntary choice is both requisite and beneficial, why do physicians often downplay 
the voluntary nature of clinical trials?  Researchers may fear empowering participants due to their 
urgent need for volunteer subjects.  The enormous industry demand for new drugs translates into 
an enormous demand for clinical trial participants.31  Adding to the weight of demand, physicians 
and researchers also feel pressured by time.  Because of the restraints of patent term expiration, 
the manufacturer must push a new drug through the FDA approval process as quickly as 
possible.32  Although the FDA and the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) have worked together 
to promulgate regulations that help accommodate the unique requirements of the drug industry,33 
manufacturers must still race to get products to market.  In short, researchers urgently need 
clinical trial volunteers.  
In order to recruit clinical trial volunteers, the informed consent process must 
communicate a tolerable level of risk to the subject.  The goal of recruiting volunteers could be 
achieved by omitting or misrepresenting the risks so that the subject views participation as a 
negligible risk.  This approach blatantly violates the rules governing ethical medical research and 
is therefore an unacceptable means of conducting the necessary risk communication.34  As 
opposed to simply lying, the researcher might be tempted to present the clinical trial as the only 
viable choice for the subject.  The legality of such implied coercion is highly questionable.  If 
alternative treatment is available, the physician must present each option and its probable 
consequences to the potential volunteer.35  Disclosing all alternatives should include presenting 
the option of not pursuing any further medical treatment.  In some cases of terminal or incurable 
illness, the clinical trial might represent the last option for a patient.  Many cancer patients who 
have shown resistance to standard forms of treatment view clinical trials as a means to gain 
access to experimental drugs that offer a glimmer of hope for recovery.36  It is tempting to present 
an experimental protocol as the only remaining viable choice to this vulnerable class of potential 
subjects.  Even when both the patient and the physician view the clinical trial as a last resort, the 
informed consent process should not present enrollment as the only option.   
                                                     
31 Aoki, supra note 3, at D1. 
32 Washburn, supra note 5, at W16. 
33 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2003). 
34 21 C.F.R. § 50.20 (2003). 
35 § 50.25(a)(4). 
36 See Bernadette Tansey, Experiments of humans; A split verdict on clinical trials; Studies offer 
hope – and raise a series of ethical questions, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 6, 2002, at A1. 
Coercion, even well-intentioned coercion, stands contradictory to the risk perception model of 
voluntarism described above.  Because individuals are more likely to engage in risks chosen 
voluntarily, coercion is more likely to deter than attract participants.  A researcher should 
accentuate that participation is voluntary and present all other available options including the 
option of discontinuing medical treatment.  By using the risk perception concept of voluntary 
choice, the informed consent process can heighten both safety and participation. 
•  “Most people are less afraid of a risk they feel they have some control 
over”37 
For example, many people would rather drive as opposed to riding as a passenger in a car 
or airplane.38  The relationship between control and risk perception is a simple extension of the 
previous discussion about choice.  Exerting control over a risk means maintaining voluntary 
choice.   
The risk perception principle of control can positively affect participation in clinical 
trials.  Physicians must inform subjects that they may quit the clinical trial at any time.39  Thus, 
the decision to participate is voluntary not just at enrollment, but throughout the duration of the 
trial.  This risk perception concept highlights the ideal model of an ongoing, communicative 
relationship between physician and volunteer.   
Confronting the Therapeutic Misconception 
•  “Most people are less afraid of risks if the risk also confers some 
benefits they want.”40 
This risk perception principle is most predictive of how a potential volunteer perceives 
the clinical trial risk.  An analysis of the benefits of clinical trials reveals how the risk perception 
principle of benefit plays out in the clinical trial setting.  First, participation may convey a “direct 
benefit, that is, benefit to subjects from receiving the intervention being studied.”41  In other 
words, a direct benefit occurs when the experimental drug itself conveys a benefit to the subject.  
Second, participation also conveys a “collateral benefit, benefit anticipated for all subjects by 
virtue of being a subject in a study, rather than by virtue of receiving the intervention being 
studied (such as the provision of free care of the assertion that patients get better treatment on 
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study because of increased monitoring, state-of-the-art testing, etc.).”42  Lastly, participants may 
associate clinical trials with the altruistic “benefit to society, to scientific knowledge or to future 
patients, rather than to current subjects.”43  The risk perception principle indicates that when a 
volunteer recognizes potential benefits of participation, the volunteer is more likely to enroll in 
the clinical trial.  Thus, the risk perception principle guides the physician to disclose all related 
benefits associated with the clinical trial.  Furthermore, the current legal standard requires the 
physician to disclose benefits.44  Thus, risk perception and law seem well aligned in this instance.  
Trouble arises, however, in early phase clinical trials when direct benefits remain unconfirmed. 
Most subjects volunteer for clinical trials in pursuit of direct benefits, although collateral 
benefits and benefits to society also play a role in encouraging participation.45   A 1999-2000 
survey asked 1,050 volunteers why they participated in clinical trials.  Although some were 
primarily motivated by collateral or societal benefits, the majority of respondents participated to 
obtain direct benefits:   
Percent of respondents stating their top reason . . . 
• Find relief: 60%;  
• Advance science: 23%;  
• Earn extra money: 11%;  
• Receive better medical care: 6%46   
This revelation becomes problematic for the informed consent process when volunteers 
are motivated by perceived, but unsubstantiated, direct benefits.  Direct benefits are not supported 
by scientific data until the third and final stage of clinical trials.  Recall that phase 1 clinical trials 
only test for toxicity.  Phase 2 trials are the first attempt to measure efficacy for human subjects.  
It is not until phase 3 clinical trial that direct benefits find support in the form of phase 2 efficacy 
studies.47  Thus, clinical trial protocols often lack immediate factual support for direct benefits.  
Nevertheless, most subjects choose to enroll based on the distant hope that the experimental drug 
will offer relief.  Experts in risk communication use the term “therapeutic misconception” to 
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describe this “unrealistic expectation of direct benefit to subjects.”48  Sometimes, the therapeutic 
misconception is so powerful that it generates its own direct benefits: 
Studies show that patients believe they will receive a therapeutic benefit 
from research – even if they know they may receive only a placebo 
treatment.  And, strangely enough, they often do: one recent study 
showed that 35 per cent of placebo patients improved, in trials involving 
seriously ill subjects.  Apparently, the sheer hope of recovery is often 
enough to alleviate symptoms.49 
Because the therapeutic misconception exists in the minds of so many potential 
volunteers, understanding this false hope is a crucial part of understanding “where the public is 
coming from.”50  The informed consent process should not only provide accurate representations 
of the risks and benefits, but should also debunk the closely held misperceptions that guide many 
volunteers.   
One of the easiest ways to help eliminate misconception is to start with semantics.  For 
example, informed consent documents refer to gene transfer protocols as “gene therapy.”  Using 
the term “therapy” inappropriately implies that the experimental protocol is designed to treat, to 
offer direct benefits.51  By consistently renaming the protocol “gene transfer research”, subjects 
may begin to more fully understand the intention of the clinical trial. Beyond that, physicians 
should also candidly confront the therapeutic misconception.  Yet false hope may stubbornly 
survive: “Even when they have been explicitly informed to the contrary, subjects still believe they 
are getting the treatment that is best for them, not best for science.” 52 
The risk perception principle of benefit suggests that the associated benefits of clinical 
trials positively affect enrollment.  Although collateral and societal benefits motivate some 
participants, most volunteers enroll to obtain direct benefits.  Because most clinical trial protocols 
cannot offer direct benefits, the physician must not only decline from offering such false 
promises, she must also strive to undermine the therapeutic misconception that erroneously 
entices many subjects. 
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Financial Conflicts of Interest 
• “Most people are less afraid of risks that come from places, people, 
corporations, or governments they trust, and more afraid if the risk 
comes from a source they don’t trust.”53 
The element of trust works both for and against the physician in his effort to effectively 
communicate during the informed consent process.  During the course of clinical trials, the 
manufacturer will test the experimental new drug on subjects who suffer from the target disease.  
These subjects often learn that they are candidates for a clinical study from their doctor.  After 
enrollment, the volunteer is both a patient and a subject.  Similarly, the doctor becomes both a 
physician and a researcher.  In cases where the subject-researcher relationship grows from a 
patient-physician relationship, the foundation of trust is already built; the trust between patient 
and physician grows from a sustained professional relationship.  This trust is especially strong 
when the patient and physician have been working together for years specifically to treat the 
target disease.  When the physician’s role shifts from administering treatment to administering an 
experiment, trust alleviates the patient’s fears about ethical misconduct.  On the other hand, trust 
deceives the patient into believing that the clinical trial is a form of treatment, thereby 
exacerbating the therapeutic misconception.54 
In addition to the conflict caused by the physician acting as both physician and 
researcher, the more troubling conflict of interest results when the physician-researcher also has a 
financial interest in the outcome of the clinical trial.  Just as the volunteer holds unsubstantiated 
hopes that the experimental drug will produce the intended results, a physician with a financial 
interest in the experimental drug holds similar unsubstantiated hopes.  And just as a subject’s 
hope alone may boost health, it appears that the hope of profit is enough to boost data results too: 
a “report in the Journal of the American Medical Association . . . found that nonprofit studies of 
cancer drugs were eight times more likely to reach unfavorable conclusions than industry-
sponsored studies.”55   
Despite the possible consequences of financial ties between research and medicine, this 
symbiotic relationship makes sense.  The physician invests her professional life in pursuit of 
wellness - why not her financial interests as well?   Physicians, like all other professionals, must 
draw a line between being bought and being paid.  Responsible disclosure and oversight, as 
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opposed to absolute restriction and prohibition, should govern the financial interests of physician-
researchers. 
Financial conflict of interest affects the informed consent process by affecting trust 
between patient and physician.  Trust, in turn, affects risk perception.  The medical professional 
must reach a balance between using trust and abusing trust.  An appropriate relationship of trust 
helps create the ideal model of partnership between physician and subject. 
Conclusion 
Risk perception creates a framework in which to address the current failure of informed 
consent.  The concepts of choice, control, benefit, and trust shed light on how a volunteer 
perceives risk.  By understanding how the volunteer perceives and reacts to risk, we can revise 
the existing informed consent process to better achieve its objectives of protecting volunteers as 
well as encouraging participation. 
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